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A New Theory of Trademarks
Chad J. Doellinger*
Abstract
The economic approach to trademark law has reigned supreme for
almost two decades. Yet few have critically examined the theory. This
article seeks to do just that. The economic approach has stripped
trademark philosophy of much of its inherent flexibility and normative
depth. At its core, trademark law provides a normative code of proper
business conduct. This concept-which I call "integrity"-is at the heart
of trademark jurisprudence. Indeed, trademark law has always been a
rich and normatively driven body of law, with deep common law roots
and traditions. It is precisely those qualities-currently being eroded
away by courts and scholars alike-that have permitted trademark law to
effectively deal with more than 100 years of diverse factual patterns and
remain not only relevant but also central to our system of commerce.
I.

Introduction

Trademark philosophy is in need of a new look. The economic
approach to trademarks, which has reigned supreme for more than a
decade, has rarely been seriously examined let alone challenged. Indeed,
since the watershed article by Professor Landes and Judge Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,1 few have critically
examined the theory. This article seeks to do just that. Such an
examination reveals a fundamental flaw with the economic approach: it
has shifted from an ex post descriptive theory to an ex ante normative
one. In so doing, it has gradually eroded the true normative-and
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moral-foundation of trademark law.
Part I of this article will provide a historical overview by
examining the Supreme Court's trademark jurisprudence over the last
130 years. From this broad perspective, the duality of trademark lawprotection of both consumers and tradespersons-becomes clear. In
addition, and even more importantly, its normative foundation, integrity,
is revealed. At its core, trademark law provides a normative code of
proper business conduct. Part III will critically examine the economic
approach to trademark law. I will argue that this structural approach is
based on several fundamental misunderstandings and thus fails to
adequately address trademark law's normative depth. Part IV will
examine a doctrinal crisis caused by the unquestioned acceptance of the
economic approach. Indeed, armed with an economic paradigm, recent
commentators-and a few forward thinking courts-have attempted to
graft antitrust standing requirements and per se rules into trademark
jurisprudence. Such efforts unnecessarily curtail trademark rights by
disconnecting the jurisprudence from its common law roots. Part V of
this article will provide modest suggestions to reconnect trademark
jurisprudence to its normative history and doctrinal moorings.
Trademark law has always been a rich and normatively driven body of
law, with deep common law roots and tradition. It is precisely those
qualities-currently being eroded away by courts and scholars alikethat have permitted it to effectively deal with more than 100 years of
diverse factual patterns and remain not only relevant but also central to
our system of commerce.
I.

A.

History of Trademark Law: Tradespersons, Consumers and
Integrity
The Duality of Trademark Law: Tradespersonsand Consumers

Trademarks are defined in the Lanham Act to include "any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by a person...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods.., from those manufactured
or sold by others."2 Under this broad definition, a wide variety of
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). This definition was meant to codify the common law,
so it is no surprise it resembles the definition given by the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century:
[A] trade-mark may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the
goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those
manufactured or sold by another, to the end that the goods may be known in the
market as his, and to enable him to secure such profits as result from his
reputation for skill, industry, and fidelity.
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commercial symbols have been found to be trademarks, including words,
Few have
phrases, product configurations, colors and sounds.3
articulated the depth of trademark philosophy more eloquently than
Justice Frankfurter in 1942:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The
owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.
Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value.
If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism
of the symbol he
4
has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Trademark law was thus intended to protect the goodwill of the
tradesperson and, in turn, protect the consumer from being deceived.
This dual nature of trademarks has always been at the core of trademark
jurisprudence.
Some misunderstandings have arisen regarding the
duality of trademarks, in large part because of the rhetoric used by
courts. Some courts focus heavily on the tradesperson,5 while others

McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877); see also Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer,
101 U.S. 51, 53 (1879) ("The general doctrines of the law as to trade-marks, the symbols
or signs which may be used to designate products of a particular manufacture, and the
protection which the courts will afford to those who originally appropriated them, are not
controverted.").
3. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995)
(recognizing the wide variety of protectable marks).
4. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
5. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992)
("[T]he Act's purpose [was] to 'secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business."'); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) ("The
redress that is accorded in trademark cases is based upon the party's right to be protected
in the good will of a trade or business."); Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1879) (Clifford, J.,
dissenting) ("They are used in order that such products, manufactures, or merchandise
may be known as belonging to the owner of the symbol or device, and that he may secure
the profits from its reputation or superiority."); McLean, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877) ("[T]he
court proceeds on the ground that the complainant has a valuable interest in the good-will
of his trade or business, and, having adopted a particular label, sign, or trade-mark,
indicating to his customers that the article bearing it is made or sold by him or by his
authority, or that he carries on business at a particular place, he is entitled to protection
against one who attempts to deprive him of his trade or customers by using such labels,
signs, or trade-mark without his knowledge or consent.").
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justify an outcome by looking towards the consumer.6 In reality, neither
conception alone fully captures the real nature of trademark law.7
Trademark philosophy has always been about the delicate balance
of these two functions. As Justice Clifford noted in 1879, "[e]quity
courts in all civilized countries have for centuries afforded protection to
trade-marks, the object of such protection being not only to secure to the
individual the fruits of his skill, industry, and enterprise, but also to
protect the public against fraud.,8 Given that the Lanham Act was
intended to codify the common law, it is no surprise that the Lanham Act
was also intended to serve these dual functions. This is made clear by
the Act's legislative history:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the
owner of a trade-mark has spent energy; time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the wellestablished
rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark
9
owner.

6. See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Nielsen, 179 U.S. 43, 45 (1900) (finding liability because
"[t]he label is so obviously an imitation of the Saxlehner label that defendant makes no
argument to the contrary, and the appearance of the two is so nearly alike that a casual
purchaser would easily suppose he was purchasing the Hunyadi Janos water in buying
that of the defendant."); Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcom, 150 U.S. 460, 467 (1893)
(explaining that "[e]ven in the case of a valid trade-mark, the similarity of brands must be
such as to mislead the ordinary observer.").
7. Although the difference is largely semantic, this subtle shift is crucial to
correcting several misconceptions about trademark law. But see Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundationsof TrademarkLaw, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2007)
(arguing that the common law foundation of trademark law is based solely on the
protection of the tradesman).
8. Trainer, 101 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added) (Clifford, J., dissenting); see also
Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 223 (1883) ("His trade-mark is both a sign
of the quality of the article and an assurance to the public that it is the genuine product of
his manufacture. It thus often becomes of great value to him, and in its exclusive use the
court will protect him against attempts of others to pass off their products upon the public
as his. This protection is afforded not only as a matter of justice to him, but to prevent
imposition upon the public."); Trainer, 101 U.S at 62 ("[T]he foundation of the rule
being that the public interest as well as the interest of the owner of the trade-mark
requires that protection."); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (noting the two
distinct purposes of trademark law, namely preventing injury to goodwill and injury to
consumers).
9. S.REp. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277.
Congressman Lanham explained the dual nature of trademark protection: "The purpose
of [this Act] is to protect legitimate business and the consumer of the country." 92 CONG.
REC. 7524 (daily ed. June 25, 1946) (statement of Rep. Lanham).
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This historical balancing of interests and reliance on confusion remains
the lynchpin of liability in trademark jurisprudence to the present day.1 °
Trademark philosophy is thus defined by two purposes-protecting the
tradesperson and the consumer-working harmoniously together. Any
coherent theory of trademark jurisprudence must therefore accommodate
both functions.1
B.

Trademark Law and Integrity: The Promotion of Fairness

Underlying its function of protecting tradespersons and consumers,
trademark law provides a normative code of fair competition. Edward S.
Rogers, a primary draftsman of the Lanham Act, eloquently captured this
principle more than ninety years ago: "People are beginning to realize
that business should be conducted as games are played among
gentlemen-not only in accordance with the letter of the rules but with a
proper sense' 3 of sportsmanship.' ' 12 I call this first-tier normative principle
"integrity."'
Justice Field summarized this normative principle in 1883: "[t]he
[trademark] doctrine enunciated in all these cases is founded in honesty
and good sense; it rebukes fraud and encourages fair dealing with the
public."' 4 Almost 100 years later, in the slightly analogous context of
trade secret law, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle: "The
necessity of good faith and honest,. fair dealing, is the very life and spirit
of the commercial world.' 5 In the century between Manhattan Medicine
Co. v. Wood and Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., this principle of integrity
has been frequently articulated in trademark law. 16 In 1893, the Court
10. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
11. See infra Part III (noting that modem trademark theory, especially the economic
theory, often neglects the tradesmen in the analysis).
12. EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 281
(1914).
13. One should not confuse my use of the term with Professor Stephen Carter's
notion of integrity. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY (1997). Professor
Carter's view relates to the characteristics of personal integrity, involving having the
courage of one's convictions. See id. It should also not be confused with Professor
Ronald's Dworkin's interpretative theory, "law as integrity." See generally RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). My conception of integrity underlying trademark
philosophy is derived from the concept described by Edward Rogers. See supra note 12.
14. Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 227 (1883). In Manhattan
Medicine, the Court determined that the trademark at issue was invalid because of the
alleged mark owners' own misconduct. See id. For a further discussion of how the
normative principle of integrity applies to plaintiffs, see infra text accompanying notes
27 & 28.
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (citations
omitted).
16. See, e.g., Howe Scale Co. of 1886 v. Wyckoff, Seamans, & Benedict, 198 U.S.
118 (1905); Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893).
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explained the importance of integrity in trademark philosophy:
There can be no question of the soundness of the plaintiffs'
proposition that, irrespective of the technical question of trade-mark,
the defendants have no right to dress their goods up in such manner
as to deceive an intending purchaser, and induce him to believe he is
buying those of the plaintiffs. Rival manufacturers may lawfully
compete for the patronage of the public in the quality and price of
their goods, in the beauty and tastefulness of their inclosing packages,
in the extent of their advertising, and in the employment of agents,
but they have no right, by imitative devices, to beguile the public into
buying their17 wares under the impression they are buying those of
their rivals.

In 1938, the Court identified the principle of integrity (or, in the words of
the Court, "fairness") as central in its inquiry: "The question remains
whether Kellogg Company in exercising its right to use the name
'Shredded Wheat' and the pillow-shaped biscuit, is doing so fairly.
Fairness requires that it be done in a manner
which reasonably
8
distinguishes its product from that of plaintiff.'
This normative principle was meant to be codified in the modern
Lanham Act, as confirmed by the legislative history:
The Lanham Act's purpose was "to protect the public from deceit, to
foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the
advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion
from those who have created them
to those who have not. This is the
' 19
end to which this bill is directed."
Just three years ago, the Supreme Court confirmed this purpose:
"Infringement law protects consumers from being misled by the use of
infringing marks and also protects producers from unfair practicesby an
'imitating competitor."' 20 The normative principle of integrity thus helps
identify whether conduct should be permitted or sanctioned. In other
words, integrity serves as an important limiting factor on both of the
17. Coats, 149 U.S. at 566; see also Howe Scale Co., 198 U.S. at 137 ("The question
is whether his use [of plaintiffs mark] is reasonable and honest, or is calculated to
deceive.").
18. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938).
19. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277
(emphasis added).
20. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court's recent decision in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004) further supports my view. The Court relied on
the common law cases William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, and
Canal Co., discussed in the text accompanying note 23, for the proposition that trademark
law must evaluate the party's conduct in toto-and not merely rely on the presence of
absence of confusion-before determining whether to enjoin such conduct.
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other functions of trademark law, namely protection of the tradespersons
and the consumers. The normative principle is primary in that both
functional purposes of trademark law will, at times, give way.
As for the tradesperson, an alleged victim of trademark
infringement is not entitled to judicial protection if his business conduct
lacks integrity, such as misrepresenting his goods. The Supreme Court
enunciated this principle in 1883, explaining that
[a] court of equity will extend no aid to sustain a claim to a trademark of an article which is put forth with a misrepresentation to the
public as to the manufacturer of the article, and as to the place where
it is manufactured, both of which particulars were
originally
21
circumstances to guide the purchaser of the medicine.
This common law notion remains alive in equitable concepts such as
unclean hands and trademark misuse.22
Conversely, alleged tortfeasors who cause consumer confusion will
not be held liable if they acted with integrity. The Supreme Court first
explained this in 1871 in Canal Co.:
It is only when the adoption or imitation of what is claimed to be a
trade-mark amounts to a false representation, expressed or implied,
designed or incidental, that there is any title to relief against it. True
it may be that the use by a second producer, in describing truthfully
his product, of a name or a combination of words already in use by
another, may have the effect of causing the public to mistake as to the
origin or ownership of the product, but if it is just as true in its
application to his goods as it is to those of another who first applied
it, and who therefore claims an exclusive right to use it, there is no
legal or moral wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but they

are not deceived by false
23 representations, and equity will not enjoin
against telling the truth.
A few decades later the Supreme Court emphasized that the inquiry was
whether or not the defendant was acting fairly (or with integrity). The

21. Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222 (1883). Forty years later, the
Court agreed that "trade-marks which deceive the public are denied protection." Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 490 (1922) ("[Defendant] brands
or labels the cartons in which the underwear is sold, as 'Natural Merino,' 'Gray Wool,'
'Natural Wool,' 'Natural Worsted,' or 'Australian Wool.' None of this underwear is all
wool. Much of it contains only a small percentage of wool; some as little as 10 per
cent.").
22. See generally THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
COMPETITION, § 31:44 (2007).

AND UNFAIR

23. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 327 (1871) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111 (2004), expressly adopts the Clark logic.
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Kellogg Court explained that "[f]aimess requires that [the use of a name]
be done in a manner which reasonably distinguishes [the defendant's]
product from that of plaintiff., 24 Accordingly, "[t]he obligation resting
upon Kellogg Company is not to insure that every purchaser will know it
to be the 25maker but to use every reasonable means to prevent
confusion.,

The primacy of this normative principle is evident in that it requires
26
observance even in situations where no formal trademark rights exist.
Notably, in Singer Manufacturing Co., the Court held that, because the
plaintiffs utility patent had expired, all were free to use not only the
product but also the "Singer" name to describe the product.27 That the
product and the name to describe it had passed into the public domain,
24. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938).
25. Id. at 121. This principle frequently arose in the context of a surname that might
cause confusion with an existing trademark. Courts used the principle of integrity to
balance these conflicting rights. See, e.g., L. E. Waterman Co. v. Modem Pen Co., 235
U.S. 88, 94, (1914) ("But, whatever generality of expression there may have been in the
earlier cases, it now is established that when the use of his own name upon his goods by a
later competitor will and does lead the public to understand that those goods are the
product of a concern already established and well known under that name, and when the
profit of the confusion is known to, and, if that be material, is intended by, the later man,
the law will require him to take reasonable precautions to prevent the mistake."); id. at
98-99 ("The case presents no question respecting the right of an individual to the bona
fide use of his name, but rather the question whether a partnership or a corporation can,
by purchase or otherwise, obtain the right to use the name of a third party for the very
purpose of employing it in unfair competition with the established business of still
another party.... I think the Modern Pen Company should be unqualifiedly enjoined
from using the name 'Waterman."' (Pitney, J. concurring)); Thaddeus Davids Co. v.
Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 471 (1914) ("It follows that where the mark consists of a surname,
a person having the same name and using it in his own business, although dealing in
similar goods, would not be an infringer, provided that the name was not used in a
manner tending to mislead, and it was clearly made to appear that the goods were his
own, and not those of the registrant."); Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 542
(1891) ("It is hardly necessary to say that an ordinary surname cannot be appropriated as
a trademark by any one person as against others of the same name, who are using itfor a
legitimate purpose; although cases are not wanting of injunctions to restrain the use even
(emphasis
of one's own name where a fraud upon another is manifestly intended ....
added)).
26. See, e.g., Singer Mf'g Co. v. June Mfg Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
27. See id.; see also G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publ'g Co., 237 U.S. 618,
623-24 (1915).
[W]hile the right of another, after the expiration of the monopoly, to use the
generic designation, was recognized, it was also stated that its use must be such
as not to deprive the original proprietor of his rights, or to deceive the public,
and that such use of the name must be accompanied with indications sufficient
to show that the thing manufactured or sold is the work of the one making it, so
that the public may be informed of that fact,-this latter consideration arising
from the use of the name as designating the production of the original owner,
and in order to prevent confusion and unfair trade, and the wrongful
appropriation of another's rights.
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however, did not end the inquiry:
But it does not follow, as a consequence of a dedication, that the
general power vested in the public to make the machine and use the
name imports that there is no duty imposed on the one using it, to
adopt such precautions as will protect the property of others, and
prevent injury to the public interest, if by doing so
no substantial
28
restriction is imposed on the right of freedom of use.
But what is this duty? The Court explained: "This principle is
elementary, and applies to every form of right, and is generally expressed
by the aphorism, 'Sic utere tuo ut alieum non ledas."' 29 This Latin
phrase, literally translated, means "to use your own property in a way so
as not to injure that of another." The normative force of this maxim is
clear-compete fairly.
C. Integrity and the Open Texture of Trademark Law
Before we continue, it is necessary to better understand the concept
I call "integrity," and its role in trademark philosophy. As a threshold
matter, it is important to understand what I am not discussing. By
"integrity," I do not suggest that the unremarkable notion that proof of
"bad faith" or "intentional copying" can be relevant in the confusion
analysis.3 ° I also do not mean to resurrect the common law requirement
of proving "an intent to deceive" in an unfair competition action. 3'
Rather, what I mean by integrity is the underlying normative principle
32
(and thus driving force) of trademark philosophy--competing fairly.
The role of integrity in trademark philosophy is best understood by
stepping back and examining the "open texture" nature of all laws, as
eloquently explained by H.L.A. Hart.3 3
Hart explains that all laws 34 involve the classification of particular
cases within general categories.35 This leads to "a core of certainty and a
28.
29.

Singer Mfg, 163 U.S. at 186.
Id.

30.

See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 23:124 (discussing the role of intent

in trademark infringement).
31. See id. § 23:105.
32. Some might contend that my concept of integrity (or fairness) is nothing more
than the command to "not cause confusion." Uli Widmaier raised this point in reading an
early draft. If so, the concept of integrity is redundant and adds nothing analytically to
the jurisprudence. As discussed, infra, my use of integrity is not merely rhetorical.
33. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz
eds., 2d ed. 1994).
34. Hart's analysis makes use of the term "rules." I have substituted law for the sake
of simplicity.
35. Hart's notion of the generality of rules, see HART, supra note 33, at 21, appears
derived from R.M. Hare's criteria for defining proper universal imperatives, see R.M.
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penumbra of doubt.... ,,36 According to Hart, this penumbra of doubt (or
uncertainty) is a virtue given the limitations of the human mind. 37 All
humans (including our lawmakers) have a limited awareness of facts and
an uncertainty as to aim.3 8 It is these limitations that would cause any
attempt at sufficiently detailed rules to account for every possible
situation (even if theoretically possible) to fail miserably. 39 This view,
which Hart refers to as "mechanical jurisprudence," is thus doomed to
failure. 40 According to Hart, the beauty of the open texture of rules is
that, when a court chooses between competing interests when a new fact
pattern emerges, it "shall have rendered more determinate our initial aim,
and shall incidentally have settled a question as to the meaning, for the
purposes of this rule, of a general word."'4 This is done through the use
of "discretion" or by applying an ex ante "reasonable" standard.42
Trademark law is no different, with a core of certainty and a
penumbra of doubt. The concept of integrity is at the core of trademark
philosophy-the initial aim to which Hart refers. It is typically
expressed in the "confusion" standard. In other words, in the "core of
certainty" of trademark infringement, the confusion standard is an
instantiation of the normative principle of integrity.43 Even in such
cases, however, it remains crucial not to lose sight of this normative
principle, which is the "initial aim" of trademark philosophy. For
example, as noted above, confusion is not dispositive in every case. In
some cases an alleged infringer's good faith (or "fair") use of a mark
may be sufficient to preclude a finding of infringement, even where some
confusion is present. 44 Similarly, the misconduct of the trademark owner
may preclude a finding of infringement in spite of consumer confusion.45
Integrity becomes a more explicit driving force in those cases that
fall within the "penumbra of doubt." For example, when new fact

HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 1-78 (1961).
36. HART, supra note 33, at 123.

37. See id. at 128.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id. Similarly, some modem courts and commentators have attempted to turn
Lanham Act into such a mechanical act. See infra Part IV. The approach I advocate, by
returning to the underlying normative principle and rejecting mechanical jurisprudence is
not dissimilar to that advocated (more generally) by Professor Guido Calabresi. See
GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
41. HART, supra note 33, at 123.
42. See id. at 131-32.
43. Put differently, in such cases the principle "don't cause confusion" represents the
normative concept of competing fairly.
44. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 114 (2004).
45. See generally MCCARTHY supra note 22, §§ 31:44-31:58.
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patterns emerge, the application of the confusion standard is uncertain.4 6
There, integrity drives the "discretion" or the ex ante "reasonable"
standard to which Hart refers. Quite simply, in the uncertain cases the
normative principle of integrity ought to guide outcomes rather than a
(futile) mechanical application of the statute or a resort to economic
efficiencies.47 Integrity is far more than the maxim "don't cause
confusion"; it is instead the primary aim of trademark philosophy,
namely that business ought to 4be8 conducted as "gentlemen" with the
"proper sense of sportsmanship.
In the end, then, trademark law has always had two primary
functions, usually working in unison: protecting tradespersons and
protecting consumers. Underlying both principles, and at the heart of
This ofttrademark law, is the normative principle of integrity.
overlooked principle of integrity is at the core of the jurisprudence and is
essential to maintaining a coherent doctrine. Accordingly, all of these
aspects of trademark philosophy must be recognized and accommodated
to appreciate the depth and beauty of trademark law.
III.

The Economic Perspective

A. The Economic Approach to TrademarkLaw: An Overview
In 1987, Professors Landes and Posner published Trademark Law:
An Economic Perspective, which established a new trademark paradigm
that dramatically changed the way the trademark jurisprudence was
viewed. 49 According to Landes and Posner, "[t]he essential economic
function of trademarks [is] .. . reducing consumer search costs ....

This leads "the producer of a trademarked good [to] maintain a
consistent quality over time and across consumers." 51 In other words,
according to Landes and Posner, "trademark protection encourages
expenditures on quality., 52 Landes and Posner also describe a "selfenforcing feature" of trademark law, namely that trademarks "are

46. Recent examples of such uncertainty include Internet cases involving domain
names, metatags and keywords. See infra Part IV.
47. For a detailed discussion of the problems with the economic approach to trade
identity philosophy, see infra Part III. A paradigmatic example of the use of the integrity
principle in trade identity law is the historical evolution of Section 43(a). See infra Part
V.
48. ROGERS, supra note 12, at 281.
49. Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
50. Id. at 275.
51. Id. at 269.
52. Id. This "assumption" is purportedly confirmed by the economic model of
Landes and Posner. See id. at 275-80.
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valuable because they denote consistent quality, and a firm has an
incentive to develop a trademark only if it is able to maintain consistent
quality." 53 Landes and Posner conclude that the benefits associated with
reducing consumer
search costs "presuppose legal protection of
54

trademarks.,

Landes and Posner also described a secondary benefit of trademark
law-improving the language. 55 They explained that "[a]n entirely
different benefit of trademark protection derives from the incentives that
such protection creates to invest resources not in maintaining quality but
in inventing new words.
,56 They pointed to three linguistic benefits
of trademark law: (1) "[t]hey increase the stock of names of things";
(2) "[t]hey create new generic words"; and (3) "they enrich the language,
by creating words or phrases that people value for their intrinsic
pleasingness as well as their information value., 57 Landes and Posner
concluded by applying their economic model to the several aspects of
trademark law, including their "acquisition, transfer and duration,, 58 the
"requirement of distinctiveness," 59 the "defense of functionality, 60
"infringement and confusion," 6 1 and "dilution." 62 In the end, Landes and
Posner concluded that, because the economic theory adequately explains
the various aspects of trademark law, their hypothesis that "trademark
law... can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to
63
promote economic efficiency" had been proven.
Over the last fifteen years, their economic approach to trademark
law became the dominant and largely unquestioned structural and
operational paradigm. 64 The purpose of their article, according to the
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 270.
Id.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 271-73.
Id. at 271. Landes and Posner admit that "[t]hese benefits, however, are small."

Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 281-87.
59. Id. at 287-96.
60. Id. at 297-99.
61. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 300-06.
62. Id. at 306-09.
63. Id. at 265-66.
64. See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks &
Free Speech: Protecting UnauthorizedTrademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 887, 921 (2005) (accepting without analysis the economic theory of trademark law);
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act & the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) ("Unfortunately, the changes in trademark doctrine over the last
fifty years are not supported by the new economic learning. Rather, these changes have
loosed trademark law from its traditional economic moorings and have offered little of
substance to replace them."); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
163-64 (1995) (accepting the economic theory of trademark law and citing Landes and
Posner). In fact, a September 10, 2006 search of federal cases on Westlaw did not reveal
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authors, was "positive rather than normative." 65 Yet the normative
implications of this paradigm (whether intentional or not) have caused
the theory to expand well beyond its ex post descriptive purpose.
Regardless, there are several problems with the economic perspective of
trademark law.
B.

The Economic Approach Disregardsthe Normative Richness of
Trademark Law

The central problem with the economic theory is that it has become
normative, and, in the process, has jettisoned trademark philosophy from
its true normative underpinning-integrity.6 6 Rather than account for the
normative depth of trademark law, the economic approach has stripped
away much of that depth and reduced all of trademark philosophy to a
single principle: reducing consumer search costs. 67 But this principle
does not account for the law's historical and normative richness. Quite
simply, the economic model does not, nor could it, account for the
ethical function of integrity 6 8-trademark law's initial aim that has
always been at the heart of the jurisprudence. 69 Rather than recognizing
the shortcomings in its descriptive task, others have attempted to modify
trademark law to accommodate those shortcomings. 70 But this shift has
left trademark philosophy in tension with its historical and normative
roots. It is these roots that ought to guide our present evaluation and
application of trademark jurisprudence, not the economic theory.
The problem of the economic approach is that Landes and Posner
intended the theory to be positive rather than normative. 7' In other
words, the economic approach to trademark jurisprudence was not
intended to move the doctrine in new directions. But this is precisely
what the economic approach has done. It has been improperly shifted
from an adequate ex post positive theory to a shallow ex ante normative

a single judicial decision expressly rejecting, or even questioning, the economic approach
to trademarks. But see Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51
UCLA L. REv. 628 (2004) (presenting an alternative to the economics approach to
trademark law).
65. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 265.
66. For an interesting analysis of more general issues related to the economic
approach, see DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 276-95.
67. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 270.
68. See supra Parts IL.B & C.
69. Because the economic perspective cannot account for this feature, we must either
reject the normative principle or reject, in part, the economic approach.
70. For a discussion on recent developments in trademark law, see generally Daniel
M. McClure, The Latham Act After 50 Years, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1996); see
also Beebe, supra note 64.
71. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 265.
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theory. This shift improperly derives an "ought" from an "is." 72
An example from conventional morality illuminates this flaw. As a
moral actor, I might conclude that a version of consequentialism 73 -a
decision making theory driven by comparing outcomes-is the best ex
post descriptive theory of morality. 74 Indeed, I can explain most, if not
all, moral actions by the theory. Sally was right not to steal, because
stealing has the negative consequence of going to jail. Sally was right to
give money to charity, because giving money to charity has the positive
consequence of helping needy people. As an ex post descriptive (or
positive) moral theory, consequentialism captures many of the moral
intuitions we possess. The problem arises if we make the shift to an ex
ante normative theory, i.e., one that should guide our future conduct.
Even if we still reach many of the same conclusions, e.g., "don't steal,"
"give money to charity," many would find the theory lacking in two
respects. First, many might want to identify moral action with obedience
to a higher force, rather than merely an instrumental calculation. Second,
some might object that such a theory does not, in fact, capture the true
normative depth of moral action. For example, philosopher Bernard
Williams argues that a consequentialist who decides to save his drowning
wife after a consequentialist analysis had "one thought too many," in that
he should have done the "right" thing without resorting to such a
calculation. 75 Put differently, merely because the economic approach can
identify and explain some (or even many) aspects of trademark law ex
post does not permit one to conclude that trademark jurisprudence ought
to be driven by such considerations.76
The economic approach to trademark law faces yet another obstacle.
It identifies a normative principle in trademark law that does not appear
consistent with the history of the jurisprudence in improving the
72.

David Hume first recognized the problem with attempting to derive an ought

(normative principle) from an is (descriptive fact).

See DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF

HUMAN NATURE (1739 & 1740), reprintedin DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

521 (Ernest C. Mossner ed., Penguin Books 1984). This impermissible step is often
referred to as the is-ought gap. See Alan Gewirth, The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved, in
47 PROCEEDINGS & ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PHILSOPHICAL ASS'N 34, 37-38, 41, 51
(1973-1974). Many others have recognized the economic approach's is-ought problem as
it pertains to law more generally. See, e.g., Reza Dibadi, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1325, 1389-90 (2006) ("As Hume reminded us three centuries ago when he noted
the fluidity between 'is' and 'ought,' the idea that we can separate positive economics
from normative judgments is a dream." (footnote omitted)).
73. Consequentialist theories generally hold that a person ought to do whatever
action leads to the most desirable outcome.
74. Notably, consequentialism is analogous to an economic approach.
75. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM FOR &
AGAINST (Cambridge Univ. Press 1973).
76. Professor Dworkin explains: "A successful interpretation must not only fit but
also justify the practice it interprets." DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 285.
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language. 7
Landes and Posner conclude that, according to their
economic analysis, trademark law benefits language by creating new,
generic words and enriching the language by creating intrinsically
pleasing words.78 As a matter of fact and underlying principle, these
"benefits" identified by the economic approach simply do not describe,
in the positivistic sense, trademark law. Trademark law's normative
purpose is not the creation of generic words. As Professor McCarthy
explains, generic terms are the antithesis of trademark law:
The name of a product or service itself-what it is-is the very
antithesis of a mark. In short, a generic name of a product can never
function as a trademark to indicate origin. The terms "generic" and
"trademark" are mutually exclusive....
Sometimes the phrase
"generic mark" is used to denote generic names. However, this is an
inherent contradiction or an oxymoron, akin to a "square circle," a
"bright darkness" or a "gigantic miniature." Either a designation is
protectable as a "mark" or it is a "generic name" of a thing or service,
in which case it can never be a protectable mark. A given
designation cannot be both at once. Unfortunately, several courts,
including the Supreme Court, have
79 sometimes slipped into this
bewildering misuse of terminology.
Generic terms have almost nothing to do with trademark law and the
creation of such terms is not an intended purpose of the law. The only
overlap involves the situation where a term, once a trademark, becomes
generic. 8 0 This is commonly referred to as genericide. 81 For example,
words like aspirin, cellophane and thermos once functioned as
trademarks.82 Once the consuming public stopped associating those
words with a source and began associating them with the product, the
word stopped functioning as a trademark.83 Not only is this situation
rare, but it also not an aim of trademark law. That the economic
approach has identified this as a benefit of trademark law demonstrates a

77. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 271-72.
78. Id. at 271. Landes and Posner also conclude that language is benefited because
trademark law increases the "stock of names of things." Id. This reason is not a distinct
benefit to language but rather collapses into the thesis of reducing consumer search costs.
See id. at 270. According to this "language benefit," trademark law has led tradesmen to
use trademarks to identify their goods and thus reduce consumer search costs. Id. In
other words, without trademark law, all tradesmen would use the same word to identify
similar products. Taking the argument on its own terms entails that the benefit is not to
the language but rather reducing consumer search costs.
79. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 12.1.
80. Id.
81.

Id.

82.

See id.

83.

See id-
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flaw with the positivistic theory.

C. Trademarks are not Driven by Purely Efficient Concerns
Historically, trademark law has involved more than creating
The duality of trademark law, namely
economic efficiencies. 85
protecting tradespersons and consumers, did not intend to promote
economic efficiencies. 86 Similarly, the underlying normative principle,
"integrity," is incompatible with an economic analysis. 87 This is
confirmed by the earliest trademark case in this country, McLean v.
Fleming.88 In 1877, Justice Clifford explained the important function of
trademark law:
Equity gives relief in such a case, upon the ground that one man is
not allowed to offer his goods for sale, representing them to be the
manufacture of another trader in the same commodity. Suppose the
latter has obtained celebrity in his manufacture, he is entitled to all
the advantages of that celebrity, whether resulting from the greater
demand for his goods or from the higher price the public are willing
to give for the article, rather than for the goods of the other
89
manufacturer, whose reputation is not so high as a manufacturer.
Landes and Posner nevertheless conclude that "trademark law.., can
best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote
economic efficiency." 90
Accepting the economic theory on its own terms illuminates a key
problem. Landes and Posner explain the function of trademark law:
"Once the reputation is created, the firm will obtain greater profits
because repeat purchases and word-of-mouth references will generate
higher sales and because consumers will be willing to pay higher prices
for lower search costs and greater assurance of consistent quality." 91 But
trademarks do not create economic efficiencies in the sense that Landes
84. Another language benefit, creating intrinsically pleasing words, see Landes &
Posner, supra note 1, at 271, demonstrates yet another shortcoming of the economic
approach. Trademark law has never involved the creation of new and innovative words.
Such a normative principle demonstrates an erroneous conflation of trademark law with
copyright and patent law.
85. See supra Part II.
86. Certainly, the law had some economic and efficiency benefits. One must be
careful, however, in assigning normative force to an ex post positive (or descriptive)
theory. See discussion of the Humean is-ought gap, supra note 72.
87. See supra Part II for a more detailed discussion of integrity as the underlying
normative principle.
88. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
89. Id.
90. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 265-66.
91. Id. at 270.
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and Posner presume. Judge Jerome Frank, a harsh critic of trademark
law, explained: "[I]f a competitor of the manufacturer of toothpaste with
an established trade-name were to sell that identical toothpaste under the
name but at half the usual price, the consuming public would be better
off financially; nevertheless such competition would, of course, be
enjoined., 92 Although both courts and commentators rightly rejected
most of what Judge Frank believed about trademark law, his point here is
a good one. In fact, a more neutral version of this characterization was
made by Justice Brown in 1893:
For instance, a man may, by the aid of an alluring trademark, succeed
in catching the eye of the people, and palming off upon them wares
of no greater intrinsic value than those of his rivals; but such trademark may be, and usually is, wholly destitute of originality, often
taken from some prior
publication, and appropriated to the specific
93
purpose of the owner.
Simply put, trademarks permit a tradesperson to charge more for a
product than otherwise possible or economically justified.
Walking down the aisle at the local grocery store confirms this.
You can buy "Tide" detergent or the "generic" equivalent at a significant
discount. You can buy "Sudafed" or the local store's version of
pseudoephedrine. A brief review of these competing products reveals
that they are virtually identical in nature. Competitors are thus selling, as
Judge Frank would prefer, the identical products, but they are using
different trademarks. In spite of this competition, the holder of the more
well-known trademark is capable of charging a premium for the same
product.94 This appears to be, upon initial examination, the antithesis of
economic efficiency.
Landes and Posner acknowledge this objection and give it
additional economic depth:
We may seem to be ignoring the possibility that, by fostering
product differentiation, trademarks may create deadweight costs,
whether of monopoly or (excessive) competition. We have assumed
that a trademark induces its owner to invest in maintaining uniform
product quality, but another interpretation is that it induces the owner
to spend money on creating, through advertising and promotion, a
spurious image of high quality that enables monopoly rents to be
obtained by deflecting consumers from lower-price substitutes of
equal or even higher quality. In the case of products that are
produced according to an identical formula, such as aspirin or
92.
93.
94.

Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1943).
Duer v. Corbin Cabinet Lock Co., 149 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1893).
See id.
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household liquid bleach, the ability of name-brand goods (Bayer
aspirin, Clorox bleach) to command higher prices than generic
(nonbranded) goods has seemed to some economists and more
lawyers an example of the power of brand advertising to bamboozle
the public and thereby promote monopoly; and brand advertising
presupposes trademarks-they are what enable a producer readily to
identify his brand to the consumer. Besides the possibility of creating
monopoly rents, trademarks may transform rents into costs, as one
firm's expenditure on promoting its mark cancels out that of another
firm. Although no monopoly profits are created, consumers may pay
95
higher prices, and resources may be wasted in a sterile competition.
Their two-part response, however, lacks the intellectual rigor found in
the bulk of their analysis. They first respond by stating:
The short answer to these arguments is that they have gained no
foot-hold at all in trademark law, as distinct from antitrust law. The
implicit economic model of trademarks that is used in that law is our
model, in which trademarks lower search costs and foster quality
control rather than create social waste and consumer deception.6
Their response begs the question. Landes and Posner assume that a
system of law is either economically efficient or is objectionable.9 7 They
equate an inefficient system of law with one that "create[s] social waste
and consumer deception." 98 They disregard the very real, historically
accurate alternative, that trademark law was not intended to be merely
economically efficient and that it does far more than that.99 Put
differently, that trademark law might operate to protect both consumers
and tradesmen does not mean that the law creates social waste and
consumer deception.
Apparently recognizing the problem with their first response,
Landes and Posner provide (in their own words) a "longer" response:
A longer answer, which we shall merely sketch, is that the hostile
view of brand advertising has been largely and we think correctly
rejected by economists. The fact that two goods have the same
chemical formula does not make them of equal quality to even the
most coolly rational consumer. That consumer will be interested not
in the formula but in the manufactured product and may therefore be
willing to pay a premium for greater assurance that the good will
actually be manufactured to the specifications of the formula.

95. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 274.
96. Id. at 274-75.
97.

See generally id. at 265-75.

98. Id. at 275.
99. See supra Part III.C.
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Trademarks enable the consumer to economize on a real cost because
he spends less time searching to get the quality he wants. If this
analysis is correct, the rejection by trademark law of a monopoly
theory of trademarks 1is
actually a mark in favor of the economic
00
rationality of that law.
Although more detailed, this response fares no better. As a threshold
matter, this response commits the same fallacy as the first. Either one
accepts the economic approach to trademark law and concludes that the
purpose of trademark law is to create economic efficiencies, or one has a
"hostile view" opposing trademark law. But, again, this excludes the
very real, and historically accurate, view that the fundamental purpose of
trademark law has little, if anything, to do with economic efficiency. 10 '
Even if we take the response on its terms, it is lacking. It is not
obvious that a consumer really selects the "Tide" over the supermarket
"generic" with the same formula because the consumer is "willing to pay
a premium for greater assurance that the good will actually be
manufactured to the specifications of the formula."'10 2 I have been going
to the same chain grocery store for over a decade. The generic "Tide"
has remained on the shelf for all of that time. As a purely rational actor,
I should probably conclude that the generic "Tide" is properly
manufactured. The time it takes me to confirm that the products contain
the same ingredients is de minimis. Accordingly, as a rational economic
actor, I should probably buy the generic substitute.10 3 Moreover, I rarely
(if ever) engage in this economic analysis. I pick up the "Tide" because I

100. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 275.
101. It is quite possible that one could fashion an ex post economic argument to
justify several of the purposes I have assigned to trademark law. For example, one could
contend that the underlying normative focus of trademark law, integrity, in its own right
creates efficiencies and promotes higher quality goods. This type of ex post argument
raises serious questions to the explanatory force of the theory, at least as it relates to
trademark law. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 285.
102. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 275.
103. Cf.Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1965).
We find an especially strong similarity between the present case and those
cases in which a seller induces the pubic to purchase an arguably good product
by misrepresenting his like of business, by concealing the fact that the product
is reprocessed, or by misappropriating another's trademark. In each the seller
has used a misrepresentation to break down what he regards to be an annoying
or irrational habit of the buying public-the preference for particular
manufactures or known brands regardless of a product's actual qualities, the
prejudice against reprocessed goods, and the desire for verification of a product
claim. In each case the seller reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer
will be satisfied with the performance of the product he receives. Yet, a
misrepresentation has been used to break the habit and, as was stated in
Algoma Lumber, a misrepresentation for such an end is not permitted.
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have always picked up the "Tide." One might refer to this merely as
habit, a rule of thumb, or even my being "brain-washed" by seeing too
many "Tide" commercials as a young child. Regardless, I pick up the
"Tide" without thinking about it. Quite simply, my decision to buy
"Tide," rather than an identical, lower-priced substitute, is an
economically irrational act.1°4
A third response, implicit in the Landes and Posner article, is that
the protection of trademarks provides incentives to create higher quality
products and that consumers will benefit from the higher quality. 10 5 In
other words, if a competitor were able to produce the identical toothpaste
at half the price, consumers would suffer because the original
manufacturer would not invest in making good toothpaste. But this is a
non sequitur. It is entirely possible that the original toothpaste
manufacturer would still manufacture high quality toothpaste absent
strong trademark protection. Although the tradesperson's toothpaste
sales would be reduced in the world without trademarks, he would
certainly still have sales. The tradesperson thus might still decide to
manufacture a high quality product for a variety of reasons, from
financial necessity, to personal pride or ethics, to a desire to make a
product. Moreover, it is entirely possible that a tradesperson, in the
hypothetical world without trademark law, might take other self-help
measures to ensure that others do not palm off their goods as his. It is
thus exceedingly difficult to determine, a priori, what a United States
without trademark law would be like and, even more difficult, to
determine how tradespersons would behave in such a world. 10 6 It is not
at all clear that trademarks necessarily lead to higher quality goods. 10 7 In
the end, the conclusion that trademark law is fundamentally about
creating economic efficiencies is contrary to both fact and history.
D. The Economic Approach ErroneouslyClassifies Trademarks as
Property
Trademarks are not property. The late Beverly Pattishall, often
referred to as the "Dean of the American Trademark Bar,"'1 8 made this
104. This conclusion should be construed as a criticism of trademark law. It merely
proves the point that trademark law was not designed to be (and is not) purely
economically efficient.
105. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 269.
106. Some might point to other countries with little (or no) trademark protection, but
that misses the mark. One needs to make assumptions on how people would behave in a
country with our economic system and freedoms without trademark law. Any
conclusions reached otherwise are unreliable and unsupportable.
107. Landes and Posner rely on, as they must, little more than a phenomenological
argument for this proposition. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 269.
108.

See, e.g., Mark T. Banner, PTO Fee Increases, OrganizationalChanges Coming,
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point several decades ago.
His succinct reasoning needs no
modernization today. 0 9 Pattishall believed that courts and commentators
had erroneously analogized trademark rights with patents and
copyrights." 0 He explained that "[t]he courts have always been hard put
to fit the law of trade identification into some traditional 'pigeonhole.""" Unfortunately, according to Pattishall, "the courts satisfied
their unavailing search for precedent by treating trade identi[ty] rights,
especially when symbolized in a particular mark, as a form of personal
property or personal property right."' 1 2 But trademark rights are not
property rights as the word is commonly used.' 1 3 Merely because a party
has the right to exclude a use when that use causes confusion does not
entail a property right in a word or symbol." 4
Pattishall did
acknowledge, however, that in a strictly legal sense a trade identity right
might fall within the category of property rights:
True, in the sense that almost any legal right may, perhaps, be
described as a "property" right, so may trade-mark and trade
identification rights be loosely referred to as "property" rights. But in
the ordinary sense they are not, and the ordinary connotations of the
words "property" and "ownership" lead only to error and
contradiction in resolving the questions which arise in trade
identification cases.115

In other words, putting aside excessive formalism, trademark rights are
not property. 16 This is confirmed by the harm that is caused and the
relief that is sought. 1 7 Pattishall explained: "[t]hat which should be
prohibited is the unfair act which violates or is likely to invade the
7

CHAIR'S

BULL.,

A.B.A.

SEC.

INTELL.

PROP.

L.

(2003),

available

at

http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/bulletin/jan03chair.shtm1.
109. See Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-marks & the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 967, 986 (1952). Pattishall argued that the label "trade identity" was more
appropriate than "trademark law."
110. Id. at 985.
111. Id. at 986.
112. Id. Pattishall noted that this precedent is flawed by pointing out the
contradiction in the courts in not making the same analogy in cases of unfair competition
(of which, as Pattishall correctly concluded, trade identity rights are merely a species).
Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Pattishall, supra note 109, at 986.
116. After reviewing an early draft of this article, Uli Widmaier contends that the
property dimension of trademarks consists of just a few sticks of the fee simple property
bundle, such as ownership and (conditional) transferability. I contend that the notion of
ownership is still somewhat confused, in that it focuses the analysis on the trademark qua
trademark rather than on the trademark qua trade identity of the tradesperson. See
generally id. (explaining the semantic difficulties in describing trademark rights).
117. Seeid.at987.
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intangible individual trade identity, not the trespass upon [the] imagined
property right in any particular word or symbol."" 8 Thus, those who
view trademark rights as property rights are misconceptualizing the true
purpose and effect of trademark law. In the end, "[i]f there is any
property right involved, it is in the trader's good will. It is not in the
particular device which connects it to him and which can always be used
freely by another so long as not unfairly."" 9
Although this erroneous view was thoroughly refuted by Pattishall,
the economic approach has caused this unfortunate (mis-)classification to
resurface. The economic perspective has reinforced the misperception
that trademarks are, in fact, property. Landes and Posner initially
describe one purpose of their article as to "relate[] trademarks to other
forms of property."' 120 The authors repeatedly refer to trademarks as
property. 12 1 Moreover, the analysis is based, in large part, on the
economic theory of property. 122 Pattishall's conclusion to the contrary,
solidly founded on historical doctrine, 23 still rings true today and thus
demonstrates another fundamental flaw in the economic approach.

118. Id.
119. Id. It should be noted that, here, Pattishall's view appears consistent with my
thesis of the true normative foundation of trademark law, namely integrity. Some might
contend that Pattishall's notion of unfairness does not add anything to the analysis, in that
unfairness is synonymous with a confusing use. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 22 and
accompanying text. This ignores the normative depth of the principle of integrity. See
supra Part II.B.
120. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 265.
121. See, e.g., id. at 281 (characterizing trademarks as "a property rights system"); id.
at 282 (explaining that "[riegistration under the Lanham Act does not confer a property
right without use); id. at 293 (characterizing trademark law as a "system of property
rights in words"); id. at 300 (characterizing trademark as a "property right").
122. See id. at 266-68.
123. In addition to numerous Supreme Court decisions, see supra Part II.A., this
conception was the one held in England (the law upon which United States trade identity
law was based). The Supreme Court referenced the English decision of Ainsworth v.
Walmsley:
This court has taken upon itself to protect a man in the use of a certain
trademark as applied to a particular description of article. He has no property
in that mark per se, any more than in any other fanciful denomination he may
assume for his own private use, otherwise than with reference to his trade. If
he does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and stamps a
lion on his linen, another person may stamp a lion on iron; but when he has
appropriated a mark to a particular species of goods, and caused his goods to
circulate with this mark upon them, the court has said that no one shall be at
liberty to defraud that man by using that mark, and passing off goods of his
manufacture as being the goods of the owner of that mark.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (citing Ainsworth v.
Walmsley, (1866) 1 L.R.Eq. 524-25 (Ch.)).
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Regardless, many current courts and commentators have latched
onto the "trademarks as property" mis-analogy. 24 Law professor Mark
Lemley adopted this propertization theory in his article The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense. 125 Lemley paints a dire
picture of a world with trademarks as property, suggesting that "[u]nless
we are careful, we may end up in a world in which every thing, every
1 26
idea, and every word is owned. And we will all be the poorer for it."
Such unfounded conclusions do nothing but push trademark law further
away from its true historical and normative center.
Indeed, the continual treatment of trademarks as property has led to
serious concerns regarding the scope of rights granted to "owners."
Courts have, through either mistake or imprecision (or both), often
improperly classified trademarks as property. 127 This unfortunate trend
has been given a solid paradigm in the economic model.1 28 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court (historically) has been quite perceptive of this
confusion. Nearly ninety years ago, it noted that "[t]he word 'property'
as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of
certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes
some rudimentary requirements of good faith. 1 29 The Hanover Star
Milling Court went on to remedy the confusion surrounding trademark

124. See infra notes 125 & 127 and accompanying text.
125. Lemley, supra note 64.
126. Id. at 1715.
127. See, e.g., Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999).
The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.
That is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property." That is why the right that we all possess
to use the public lands is not the "property" right of anyone-hence the sardonic
maxim, explaining what economists call the "tragedy of the commons," res
publica, res nullius. The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect
constitutionally cognizable property interests-notably, its provisions dealing
with infringement of trademarks, which are the "property" of the owner
because he can exclude others from using them.
Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted); see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S.
176, 185-86 (1988) ("Trademark law, like contract law, confers private rights, which are
themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a bundle of such
rights .... ); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927).
[I]n a qualified sense the mark is property, protected and alienable, although as
with other property its outline is shown only by the law of torts, of which the
right is a prophetic summary. Therefore the fact that the good will once
associated with it has vanished does not end at once the preferential right of the
proprietor to try it again upon goods of the same class with improvements that
renew the proprietor's hopes.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
129 F. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
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rights and property rights. 130 The Court explained:
Common-law trademarks, and the right to their exclusive use, are, of
course, to be classed among property rights[]; but only in the sense
that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation
and the good will that flows from it, free from unwarranted
interference by others, is a propert~l right, for the protection of which
a trademark is an instrumentality.

The Court continued:
In the English courts it often has been said that there is no property
whatever in a trademark, as such.., it is plain that in denying the
right of property in a trademark it was intended only to deny such
property right except as appurtenant to an established
business or
132
trade in connection with which the mark is used.
The Court thus rejected a trademark-as-property regime: "In short, the
trademark is treated as merely a protection for the good will, and not the
subject of property except in connection with an existing business. 13 3 In
130. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 414. Other Courts agreed. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant
to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed. The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere
adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a
particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's
product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an
existing business.
Id. (citation omitted); Theodore Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 98 ("In truth, a trade-mark confers
no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for
facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or
symbol-a commercial signature-upon the merchandise or the package in which it is
sold."); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194-95
(1936).
And good will is property in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury to
any other species of property, is a proper subject for legislation. Good will is a
valuable contributing aid to business-sometimes the most valuable contributing
asset of the producer or distributor of commodities. And distinctive trademarks, labels and brands, are legitimate aids to the creation or enlargement of
such good will. It is well settled that the proprietor of the good will "is entitled
to protection as against one who attempts to deprive him of the benefits
resulting from the same, by using his labels and trade-mark[s] without his
consent and authority."
Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, this understanding is not merely a historical
anachronism. For example, more recent Courts have acknowledged the problem of tying
trademarks to property. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497 (1974).
A trade secret, unlike a patent, has no property dimension. . . . "The word
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other words, "it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be
protected.
,,134
Rejecting the property conception of trademark law matches with
our intuitive understanding of property. 135 For example, what other form
of property ceases to exist when I stop using it? What other form of
property ceases to be legally mine merely because others do not believe
it is mine? There is none. Merely because everyone who reads this
article forgets the name of the author or the law review in which it is
published does not mean that any property rights (or, as the case might
be, intellectual property rights) either I or the law review possess are
extinguished. Similarly, merely because this article finds it way to the
back of my book shelf and I stop looking at it does not mean that I have
somehow forfeited my rights in the article. In the end, then, any
conflation of trademarks with property simply does not comport with the
history, purpose or function of trademark law.' 3 6
IV. Economics, Property and the Curtailment of Trademark Rights
Driven by the widespread acceptance of the economic approach,
recent courts and commentators have attempted to properly recalibrate,
i.e., curtail, trademark rights. 137 Not surprisingly, such attempts borrow
property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs
have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they
are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied
but the confidence cannot be."
Id. (Douglas J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
134. Hanover StarMilling, 240 U.S. at 416.
135. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 2:14 (noting the problems with
improperly analogizing trademarks to real property).
136. This notion has been at the core of trade identity philosophy for decades. The
Supreme Court explained, in 1924, as follows:
Then what new rights does the trade-mark confer? It does not confer a right to
prohibit the use of the word or words. It is not a copyright. The argument
drawn from the language of the Trade-Mark Act does not seem to us to need
discussion. A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as
to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his.
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (citations omitted); see also Am.
Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trade-mark on his goods
does not prevent the adoption and use of the same trade-mark by others on
articles of a different description. There is no property in a trade-mark apart
from the business or trade in connection with which it is employed.
Id. For an interesting discussion of the effects of characterizing trademarks as property,
see Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993).

137. See, e.g., Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, & the Structure of Trademark Law, 33
HOFSTuA L. REv. 603, 608-09 (2004); Lemley, supra note 64.
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heavily from antitrust law, an arena where the economic approach has
properly flourished.138 Indeed, courts and commentators have attempted
to build a "trademark standing" requirement, analogous to the wellestablished and important antitrust standing requirement. To that end,
commentators have focused on the statutory definition of "use in
commerce" contained in the Lanham Act (hereinafter, the "Use
Solution"). 139 Although initially suggested by Professor Lemley as one
possible avenue to restore "common sense" to trademark law, 140 few
have explored this approach with as much depth or clarity as Uli
Widmaier in his article Use, Liability and the Structure of Trademark
Law.14
Widmaier's thesis is straightforward. He contends that the "use in
commerce" requirement of the Lanham Act 142 is at the core of trademark
jurisprudence. 143 Courts' derogation of this principle, according to
Widmaier, has led to the propertization of trademarks. 144 Widmaier
identifies Internet cases as the demise of the use requirement. 145 To fully
understand his thesis, a brief review of the types of Internet conduct he
evaluates is necessary. Widmaier refers to two types of Internet conduct,
the use of metatags and keywords, that have been largely responsible for
the demise of the use doctrine and thus the allegedly improper expansion
of trademark rights. 146 In the early days of the Internet, website owners
and operators would use invisible text, called metatags, to enhance the
website's placement on search engine results lists. 47 A more modem
variant of metatags involves the use of keywords. 48 A paradigmatic case
of keyword advertising, used by Widmaier, is the WhenU.com business

138.

See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (Univ. of Chicago Press 2d

ed., 2001) (explaining that goal and basic principles of current antitrust law are
economically based and that the economic approach has gained widespread recognition).
139.

See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits & the Demise of "Trademark

Use, "39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006); Widmaier, supra note 137; Lemley, supra note
64, at 1714.
140. See Lemley, supra note 64, at 1714.
141. See Widmaier, supra note 137, at 605; see also Barrett, supra note 139.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
143. See, e.g., Widmaier, supra note 137, at 605-06. Put differently, Widmaier
disregards the initial aim of integrity and replaces "confusion" with "use" as the primary
instantiation of trademark law's initial aim.

144. See id. The notion that trademarks have been "propertized" is based on little
more than misunderstandings of the normative depth of trademark law. See supra Part
III.D. Nevertheless, for the sake of responding to the Use Solution, I will not object on
this basis. Doing so would merely be begging the question.
145. See, e.g., Widmaier, supra note 137, at 605-09.
146. See, e.g., id. at 642-43, 675-77.
147. See, e.g., id. at 643. Widmaier correctly notes that this technique has largely
been made obsolete by more sophisticated search engine technologies. See id.
148. See, e.g.,
id. at 676.
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model, which it calls "contextual advertising.' 49 When a computer user
who has downloaded the software' 50 enters a term into a search engine or
browser window, a "related" pop-up advertisement will appear if that
term fits within a category in the WhenU.com directory. 151 The problem,
of course, arises when a competitor's trademark was used as a metatag,
or, more recently, as a keyword in a WhenU type directory. 15 2 Courts
have struggled, at times, in determining whether trademark law ought to
apply to such conduct. 153 Widmaier concludes that such "use" of a
trademark is not "use in commerce" as defined by Section 1127 of the
Lanham Act and thus no trademark liability can ever attach in these cases
154
(regardless of the presence or absence of deception or confusion).
Notwithstanding the simple elegance of Widmaier's proposal, the Use
Solution is flawed.
A.

The Use Solution Rids Trademark Philosophy of its Inherent
Flexibility

As a threshold matter, it is worth putting the Use Solution in
context. I criticized the economic approach to trademark law for
improperly analogizing trademark law to the law of copyrights and
patents. Here, however, the implicit analogy is a different (albeit still
improper) one-antitrust law. Widmaier's Use Solution attempts to
create a sort of injury requirement. In antitrust law:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should
reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the 55violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.1
One court summarized the need for such a requirement in antitrust law:
"[t]he antitrust injury doctrine.., has become a mainstay in the rather
arcane network of doctrines by which courts, in keeping with the intent

149. See id. at 677.
150. One version of the software is "bundled" with free software applications. See id.
at 678.
151. See id. at 680. For a more detailed description of the WhenU.com business
model, see id. at 677-80. See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F.
Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d
723 (E.D. Va. 2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D.
Mich. 2003).
152. See Widmaier, supra note 137, at 680.
153. As will be discussed, the question is really a simple one: does the conduct cause
confusion or deception? If so, liability should attach under trade identity jurisprudence.
154. See Widmaier, supra note 137, at 681-86.
155. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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of the legislature, have attempted to confine antitrust litigation to
'economically rational limits.' 15 6 This language mirrors that of Lemley
and Widmaier, who seek to return trademark law to its "traditional
economic moorings." '57 Yet the differences between antitrust law and
trademark law are stark. The antitrust injury doctrine was necessitated
by several factors, all absent from trademark law, such as the required
trebling of damages, the expense and burden of antitrust litigation, and
the wide array of commercially acceptable conduct that would fall within
a literal reading of the antitrust laws. 158 It was thus the rigidity of
antitrust law that brought about the need for the injury requirement. But
the beauty of trademark law, as acknowledged by Widmaier, is its
inherent flexibility and its nexus with empirical proof.1 59 In fact,
60
trademark law already has a built-in filter, the confusion requirement.
The desire to build in a necessary condition "more fundamental" than
confusion is unnecessary
and contrary to the purpose and history of
61
trademark law.
This is evident from a brief review of the results Widmaier hopes
will follow from his Use Solution.1 62 Widmaier argues that the use
163
requirement should preclude liability for entire categories of conduct.
He concludes that "[k]eyword use is not trademark infringement"' 64 and
that "no infringement liability can be based on [metatags]. ' 6 5 The
problem with these dogmatic conclusions is that they eviscerate the
underlying normative principle of integrity and disregard the historical
flexibility that has kept trademark law viable and healthy. Widmaier
admits as much, explaining that "[t]he genius of trademark law lies in its
contingency on empirical proof, its flexibility, its lack of dogmatism and
156. Valley Prod. Co., Inc. v. Landmark, 128 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted).
157. Widmaier, supra note 137, at 604 (citing Lemley, supra note 64, at 1688).
158. See William H. Page, The Scope of LiabilityforAntitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1445, 1445-46 (1985) (explaining that because of this rigidity and mandatory
damages, plaintiffs will often attempt to force garden-variety contract disputes into the
rubric of antitrust law). The Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue: "[T]he use of
conventional antitrust language in drafting a complaint will not extend the reach of the
Sherman Act to wrongs not germane to that Act." See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil
Co., 626 F.2d 549, 559 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). The Havoco court continued:
"[i]t is hard to ignore the suspicion that the facts have been forced into an antitrust mold
to achieve federal jurisdiction." Id. at 559.
159. See Widmaier, supra note 137, at 613.
160. See, e.g., Pattishall, supra note 109, at 975.
161. It also moves trademark law towards the mechanical jurisprudence that Hart
showed to be undesirable. See HART, supra note 33, at 128.
162. See Widmaier, supra note 137, at 608-610.
163. See id. at 610-613.
164. Id. at 608.
165. Id.
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of black-and-white responses.... ,,166 It is unclear to me, ex ante,
whether or not contextual advertising ought to result in trademark
liability. Take the hypothetical, involving the famous mark "Nike."
Assume that Under Armour purchases the "Nike" keyword, so that
whenever a web user enters "Nike" into a search engine or a browser, an
Under Armour pop-up advertisement will occur.167 Is this trademark
infringement? Again, we should not (as Widmaier does) decide this
outcome in a vacuum.
Trademark infringement is driven by
empiricism. 168 Accordingly, until we determine whether consumers were
confused by Under Armour's hypothetical conduct-guided by the
principle of integrity-we cannot know whether liability ought to
attach. 69
Widmaier's attempt to graft antitrust law standing
requirements onto trademark law and thereby remove entire categories of
conduct from the trademark analysis is fundamentally inconsistent with
the purpose, history and effectiveness of trademark law.
B.

The Use Solution is Unsupportableas a Matter of Statutory
Interpretation

Aside from the mis-analogy to antitrust law, the Use Solution
suffers from another flaw: it is unsupportable as a matter of statutory
interpretation. Widmaier argues that the Use Solution, which has been at
the core of trademark law for over a century, "is statutorily enshrined in
the Lanham Act-the modem codification of trademark law-under the
rubric 'use in commerce."",170 He explains that "[s]ection 1127 shows
that the Lanham Act codifies the common law's deep structure of
trademark law."' 171 In other words, the Use Solution is entailed,
according to Widmaier, by its codification in the Lanham Act in Section
1127. The problem with this argument is that the definition of "use in
commerce" was not originally included in the Lanham Act. 7 2 In fact, it
only became part of the statute more than forty years later, when
173
Congress passed the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 ("TLRA").
This provides a serious problem for advocates of the Use Solution. If, as
they contend, the trademark use in commerce (as they define it) has been
166.
167.

Id. at 613.
This, of course, also assumes that the web user has the software installed on her

computer.
168.
169.

See Widmaier, supra note 137, at 612.
In addition to infringement, Under Armour's conduct might be deemed to be

unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
170.

Id. at 605 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).

171.
172.

Id. at 618.

Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46, 60 Stat. 444 (1945) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051 etseq. (2005)).
173. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988).
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fundamental to trademark law since common law, they must provide a
reason why it was only introduced into the Lanham Act within the last
two decades.
This is not to say, of course, that use in commerce generally is not
vital to trademark law. Indeed, use in commerce is required to bring the
alleged conduct within the constitutional limitations of the Lanham
Act.1 74 Importantly, a supporter of the Use Solution contends that there
are two distinct uses in commerce: first, a more general use in commerce
to satisfy the constitutional requirement, and second a more specific use
in commerce to satisfy the alleged standing requirement of Section
1127.17'
The difference is apparent in looking at the contextual
advertising cases. For example, there can be little debate that the "use"
of another's trademark in contextual advertising is sufficient to fall
within the use required by the Commerce Clause. The question of
"trademark use"-as defined in the Use Solution-only arises in176the
context of the more specific use requirement-to the extent it exists.
In addition to problems with statutory history, the Use Solution is
unsupportable under the plain language of the TLRA. Although the
TLRA introduced several changes, the most significant change was the
intent to use provision. 177 For the first time (and contrary to the common
law), a tradesperson could establish "rights" in a mark without use.

78

So

long as the tradesperson verified his bona fide intent to use the mark in
commerce, he could apply to register a trademark.' 79 Notably, however,
the registration does not come to fruition until such time as the
tradesperson actually used the trademark.1 80 Moreover, a tradesperson's
intent to use application could not continue in perpetuity. If the
tradesperson did not establish use after a statutorily prescribed period of
time, the application was deemed abandoned.' 8'

174.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ...

[t]o

regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes"). As the Supreme Court decided long ago, trademark law finds its
constitutional support not in the Intellectual Property Clause but rather in the Commerce
Clause. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879).
175. Widmaier, supra note 137, at 622.
176. Simply put, the presence of "use" in Sections 32 and 43(a) does not provide
support for the Use Solution. It, instead, merely brings the Lanham Act within the limits
of the Commerce Clause.
177. See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 5.9. For a summary of other changes made by
the TLRA, see id.
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1).
179. See id.
180. See id. § 1051(d).
181. See id. The maximum statutory provision is thirty-six months. See generally
MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 19.13.
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This amendment was not intended to broaden the substantive rights
available to a tradesperson, but instead it was intended to address an
unfortunate commercial reality that had evolved over time. 182 Because of
the desire to obtain federal registration as early as possible (and thereby
obtain constructive notice and a national right of priority), tradespersons
filed applications based on small or isolated uses, commonly called
"token uses."'' 83 A tradesperson might print up a few t-shirts or business
cards using the purported trademark in an attempt to obtain a federal
registration based on de minimis use. 184 To prevent such uses, Section
l(a) was amended to read as follows: "[t]he owner of a trademark used
in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal
register.
,185 Use of a trademark in commerce is defined as "the bona
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark."'' 86 The TLRA thus eliminated registrations
based on token use.
The purpose of this new definition-at the heart of the Use
Solution-was to prevent token uses that tradespersons had historically
used to "stockpile" trademark registrations. Quite simply, it relates not
to a threshold pseudo-standing requirement but rather to a tradeperson's
use necessary to obtain a registration. This is confirmed by the plain
language of the statute: "[t]he term 'use in commerce' means the bona
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark."'187 But a defendant's conduct that might be
182.
183.

See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 5.9 (citing legislative history).
See F.T. Alexandra Mahaney, Incontestability: The Park 'N Fly Decision, 33

UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1173-74 (1986).

184. See, e.g., id. (discussing how companies were exploiting the trademark system
by token use systems). The intent behind such token uses was not necessarily
exploitative. Given the substantial investment that many tradespersons were making in
selecting and developing a new trademark, such tradespersons were at substantial risk of
an unscrupulous third party coming in and obtaining a federal registration for the mark
(with commercial use on a much smaller scale) and thereby holding the first tradesperson
hostage.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (emphasis added). This was an express purpose of the
TLRA.
By permitting applicants to seek protection of their marks through an "intent to
use" system, there should be no need for "token use" of a mark simply to
provide a basis of an application. The use of the term "bona fide" is meant to
eliminate such "token use," and to require, based on an objective view of the
circumstances, a good faith intention to eventually use the mark in a real and
legitimate commercial sense. Obviously, what is real and legitimate will vary
depending on the practices of the industry involved, and should be determined
on the standards of that particular industry.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT OF 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 1001028, at 8-9 (Oct. 3, 1988).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
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considered infringing (whether through labels, metatags or keywords)
has absolutely nothing to do with attempting to "reserve a right in a
mark." For this definition to apply to a defendant, as the Use Solution
requires, this phrase must be ignored. Accordingly, such a reading is
unacceptable. 188
Widmaier's reading of the "use in commerce" definition also
renders the fair use provision in the Lanham Act superfluous. 89 The fair
use defense provides that a defendant's use is not actionable where the
use is of a kind "otherwise than as a mark" 190 and is "descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services," 9 1 of
the defendant. Yet the Use Solution requires that a defendant make use
of the plaintiff's trademark in a way that meets the definition in Section
1127 for the possibility of liability to attach. In other words, before a
court can even get to the fair use analysis, a defendant must be making
"bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade."'192 But if the
court determines that, pursuant to Section 1127, the defendant is making
"bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade," 93 it could not
194
then conclude that defendant's use is "otherwise than as a mark"'
because a bona fide use cannot be a use "otherwise than as a mark."
Accordingly, the Use Solution renders the fair use defense superfluous
95
and unacceptable.'
196
C. The Use Solution has no Bearing on Unfair Competition

Even if the Use Solution applied to trademark infringement, i.e.,
Section 32, which it clearly does not, it does not apply to unfair
competition, i.e., Section 43(a). Use in commerce refers to the use of a
"mark" in commerce, and a mark is defined as "any trademark, service

188.

Professor Barrett acknowledged some of the problems with a "literal" reading of

Section 1127, yet he disregarded the plain language of the statute in support of the Use
Solution. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 382-87.

189. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation that all provisions must be
given meaning. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("'[A] statute
ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence,
or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant."').
190. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2006).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 1127.
193. Id.
194. Id. § 1115(b)(4).
195. This is a particularly problematic reading in that it requires one to conclude that
the Congress intended, through the 1988 amendment intended to eliminate token use, to
eliminate the fair use defense that had been central to trademark law since common law.
196. See id. § 1125. For an overview of the development and breadth of Section
43(a), see discussion, infra Part V.
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mark, collective mark, or certification mark."' 197 But defendants' uses in
Section 43(a) are far broader, including "uses in commerce of any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact."' 198 Accordingly, the Section 1127
definition is inapposite to this analysis.' 99
More importantly, however, applying the Use Solution to Section
43(a) would render an entire body of law obsolete and overruled.
Section 43(a)(1)(B) provides a cause of action for false advertising. The
statute prevents the
use[] in commerce [of] any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation
of fact, which... in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her2 or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities. 00
Such conduct, even when resulting in liability, often has absolutely
nothing to do with the "trademark use in commerce" of a plaintiffs
mark. In fact, a party can be liable for false advertising under the
Lanham Act for making false claims that do not use a trademark at all.2O
Quite simply, if, as Widmaier contends, the Section 1127 definition of
"use in commerce" must be forced into all parts of the Lanham Act,
Congress fundamentally altered several long-standing bodies of
when it inserted a definition to
precedent and eliminated doctrine
20 2
problem.
use
token
the
eliminate
In the end, attempting to determine outcomes ex ante through a
"trademark injury" requirement using mechanical jurisprudence 20 3 is
unhelpful and unsupportable. Instead, the question in any trademark
case, whether it is phrased in terms of a judicially created subdoctrine,

197. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
198. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
199. This further supports the conclusion that the use in commerce referenced in both
Section 32 and 43(a) refers to the use required to bring the statute within the ambit of the
commerce clause.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
201. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.
1980) (permitting false advertising claim even though defendant was not using plaintiffs'
name or mark).
202. Again, I am not advocating that the WhenU courts come out a certain way or, as
Widmaier did, that the entire doctrine of initial interest confusion must give way in this
context. I am merely contending that this body of law cannot be so neatly dealt with on
such a formal basis.
203. See HART, supra note 33, at 128.
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e.g., initial interest confusion, or in terms of a new medium, e.g.,
keywords, is the same: Has plaintiffs trademark been invaded in such a
way to deceive?20 4 In answering this question, the duality of trademark
law must be remembered, namely protecting tradespersons and
consumers. Most importantly, however, the normative force underlying
trademark philosophy and its initial aim, integrity, must remain relevant.
V.

A Moral Theory of Trademark Philosophy

Trademark law is thus in the midst of a doctrinal crisis. The
unquestioned acceptance of the economic approach and attendant
(mis-)analogies to antitrust law are leading trademark law down a
difficult path. But "common sense ' 20 5 can be restored by a few minor
modifications (or reminders) to bring the jurisprudence in line with its
historical roots.
First, trademark law is a tertium quid. The Supreme Court first
noted in 1871 that "[p]roperty in a trade-mark, or rather in the use of a
trade-mark or name, has very little analogy to that which exists in
copyrights, or in patents for inventions. 2 °6 Little has changed in the last
207
130 years. Trademark law is related to unfair competition, not patent
law, copyright law, or antitrust law. 20 8 When we conflate it with patent
204. Pattishall, supra note 109, at 990.
205. See generally Lemley, supra note 64.
206. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322 (1871). I would, of
course, quarrel with the use of the term property to describe trademarks.
207. See, e.g., Am. Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926)
(explaining that "[t]he law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition").
208. The (erroneous) link between trademark rights and copyright and patent law
should now be clear. The (erroneous) connection to antitrust law, as noted supra Part IV,
is less obvious. Historically, however, the law of trademarks has been balanced with the
law of antitrust law. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 386 n.l (1951) ("Resale price maintenance is allowed only as respects commodities
which bear, or the label or container of which bear, the trade mark, brand, or name of the
producer or distributor and which are in free and open competition with commodities of
the same general class produced or distributed by others."); Old Dearborn Distrib Co. v.
Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936) ("The essence of the statutory
violation then consists not in the bare disposition of the commodity, but in a forbidden
use of the trade-mark, brand, or name in accomplishing such disposition. The primary
aim of the law is to protect the property-namely, the good will-of the producer, which he
still owns. The price restriction is adopted as an appropriate means to that perfectly
legitimate end, and not as an end in itself."); see also Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562, 576 n. 11 (1972) ("The trade mark may become a detrimental weapon if it
is used to serve a harmful or injurious purpose. If it becomes a tool to circumvent free
enterprise and unbridled competition, public policy dictates that the rights enjoyed by its
ownership be kept within their proper bounds. If a trade mark may be the legal basis for
allocating world markets, fixing of prices, restricting competition, the unfailing device
has been found to destroy every vestige of inhibition set up by the Sherman Act.");
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356 n.3 (1967) ("A restraint such as is here
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and copyright law, we frame trademark discussion in terms of property,
incentives and the public domain. These concepts have no relevance to
trademark jurisprudence.2 °9 When we conflate it with antitrust law, we
think in terms of rigid standing requirements and per se rules. 210 Again,
these concepts are lacking when applied to trademark jurisprudence. If
one must analogize trademark rights to something, it is best analogized to
forgery or identity theft, which rids trademark law of the many of the
involved of the resale price of a trademarked article, not otherwise permitted by law,
cannot be defended as ancillary to a trademark licensing scheme."); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) ("Nor can the restraints of trade
be justified as reasonable steps taken to implement a valid trademark licensing system,
even if we assume with appellant that it is the owner of the trademark 'Timken' in the
trade areas allocated to the British and French corporations.... A trademark cannot be
legally used as a device for Sherman Act violation. Indeed, the Trade Mark Act of 1946
itself penalizes use of a mark 'to violate the antitrust laws of the United States."'). This
historical trend was codified in the modem Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(7)
(2006) (explaining that an inconstestable mark may not be used to violate the antitrust
laws).
209. See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
Any attempt, however, to identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark
with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the writings of
authors, will show that the effort is surrounded with insurmountable
difficulties. The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally the
growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It is
often the result of accident rather than design, and when under the act of
Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither originality,
invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way essential to the right
conferred by that act. If we should endeavor to classify it under the head of
writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to
inventions, originality is required.... The writings which are to be protected
are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints,
engravings, and the like. The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the adoption
of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using it.
At common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere
adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration.
But in neither case does it depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any
work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious
thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation.
Id.; see also McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877).
Property in the use of a trade-mark, however, bears very little analogy to that
which exists in copyrights or in patents for new inventions or discoveries, as
they are not required to be new, and may not involve the least invention or skill
in their discovery or application. Phrases, or even words in common use, may
be adopted for the purpose, if, at the time of their adoption, they were not
employed by another to designate the same or similar articles of production or
sale. Stamps or trade-marks of the kind are employed to point out the origin,
ownership, or place of manufacture or sale of the article to which it is affixed,
or to give notice to the public who is the producer, or where it may be
purchased.
Id.
210. See, e.g., Use Solution discussed supra, Part IV.C.
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misconceptions. 2 11 Moreover, the key to unraveling all that apparently
ails trademark law is to understand the underlying principle of integrity.
When we rid the jurisprudence of the mis-analogies and the
misperceptions they entail and properly tether trademark philosophy to
its true normative base, the simple elegance that has guided trademark

law for over a century becomes clear.

Guided by the principle of

integrity, trademark philosophy has evolved to match the ever-changing
and shrinking world. Such doctrinal evolution is what has kept the
doctrine healthy, coherent and relevant.

Second, trademark law should be allowed to continue to evolve,
guided by the principle of integrity, to accommodate diverse fact
patterns. Again, this is nothing new. A particularly relevant example of
this natural evolution driven by the principle of integrity is evident from
an examination of the historical development of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.2 12 Although Section 43(a) never mentions trademarks or
trade dress, the Supreme Court, in Two Pesos, approved of an
interpretation as having created a federal cause of action for infringement
of an unregistered trademark.21 3 In other words, without statutory
support, the Court concluded that Section 43(a) provided that an
unregistered mark or trade dress should receive the same protection as a
registered mark.214 This transformation, which took place over several
decades and was (implicitly) driven by the normative principle of
integrity, was accepted because it was, as Justice Stevens explained,
"consistent with the purposes of the statute.
,,2 5 It has also been
endorsed by Congress. The Senate Report confirmed this purpose:
Because Section 43(a) of the Act fills an important gap in federal
unfair competition law, the committee expects the courts to continue
to interpret the section. As written, Section 43(a) appears to deal
only with false descriptions or representations and false designations
of geographic origin. Since its enactment in 1946, however, it has
been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal law of unfair
competition. For example, it has been applied to cases involving the
infringement of unregistered marks, violations of trade dress and
certain nonfunctional
configurations of goods and actionable false
2 16
advertising claims.

211. See Pattishall, supra note 109, at 983-84.
212. For a detailed explanation of this development, see Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
213. See generally Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. 763.
214. Id.
215. Id. at776.
216. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.1988, 5577,
5605. Justice Stevens agreed, quoting the United States Trade Association Trademark
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Therefore, the Lanham Act was intended to provide the courts with
the flexibility to protect tradespersons and consumers. This flexibility 21is7
guided by the underlying principle of integrity. Edward S. Rodgers
explained this simple conclusion over ninety years ago:
The courts ... are alive to the fact that in business as in the ordinary
affairs of life there are things which while in violation of no express
law, decent people do not do. Judges are realizing that relief in these
cases cannot be made to depend upon principles of law evolved in
past centuries concerning contracts, trade-marks, literary property
and the like, when conditions were different, affairs 21less
complex and
8
when parasitic ingenuity was less highly developed.
Trademark philosophy, guided by the principle of integrity, should thus
be praised for its ability to accommodate radically new and different fact
patterns rather than criticized for it.
Such evolution is necessary in the ever-changing world in which we
live. Rather than relying on formalistic textual reasoning and mechanical
jurisprudence, like the Use Solution, the plethora of new issues and fact
patterns should be approached with flexibility to accommodate the
purposes of trademark law. Indeed, a court must examine whether any
such use (keyword, domain name, or some yet unknown fact pattern)
causes confusion, keeping in mind the purpose of trademark law to
protect the tradesman and the consumer. Underlying these policy
rationales, and fundamental to all decisions, is the notion of integrity. Is
the conduct at issue fair and displaying proper sportsmanship? Some
might initially balk at such an outwardly "moral" or "flexible" standard.
Yet rather than suggesting new rules meant to curtail perceived excessive
breadth of trademark rights, my approach trusts courts and judges to
make the right decisions. Remember, of course, that integrity only
becomes an explicit driving force in those uncertain, or penumbral,

Review Commission.
Although some have criticized the expansion as unwise, it is now "a firmly
embedded reality." The United States Trade Association Trademark Review
Commission noted this transformation with approval: "Section 43(a) is an
enigma, but a very popular one. Narrowly drawn and intended to reach false
designations or representations as to the geographical origin of products, the
section has been widely interpreted to create, in essence, a federal law of unfair
competition.... It has definitely eliminated a gap in unfair competition law,
and its vitality is showing no signs of age."
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 779-80 (footnoted omitted).
217. Edward S. Rogers was the primary draftsman of the Lanham Act and the person
whom Mr. Pattishall referred to as the "Dean of the trade-mark bar." Pattishall, supra
note 109, at 967.

218.

ROGERS,

supra note 12.
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cases.
Third, the economic approach must be tempered by trademark law's
The economic approach has
underlying, historical normativity.
contributed much to our understanding of trademarks and branding
generally, demonstrating the economic efficiencies that can and are
created by the use of trademarks. But we must remember the purpose of
the economic approach, namely to provide an accurate descriptive
account of trademark law. We must not commit the is-ought fallacy and
attempt to shape the evolution of the doctrine by such considerations.
Similarly, we must not rely on the remarkable achievements in antitrust
jurisprudence for guidance here. Instead, we must allow integrity to be
our guide.
VI.

Conclusion

Trademark philosophy underwent a paradigm shift twenty years ago
when the economic approach was first introduced. Rather than spawning
critical analysis, the economic approach was eagerly accepted. This
acceptance has led to the mistaken view that economics is at the
normative core of trademark law. Armed with the economic paradigm,
courts and commentators have recently turned to antitrust law to "cure"
all that ails trademark law. The economic approach has, over the last
twenty years, gradually undermined and unsettled what was once a rich
and normatively-driven body of law. The jurisprudence must therefore
rid itself of excessive formalism and return to its common law roots
focused in integrity and proper sportsmanship.
With these principles in mind, we can tether trademark law to its
historical and normatively-rich foundations, permitting it to properly
evolve and adapt to yet unforeseen fact patterns and potentially tortious
conduct. Indeed, Edward S. Rodgers, the primary draftsman of the
Lanham Act, explained nearly a century ago that "[i]t was necessary,
therefore, [for the infringer] in some way to circumvent the law, and the
infringer, being as ingenious as he was unscrupulous, set his wits to the
accomplishment of this task., 220 This is only possible by keeping
219. Quite simply, then, any objection that this use of discretion would hamper
business decisions because it would leave the law unpredictable and uncertain is a red
herring. Hart explained:
Here, at the fringe of these very fundamental things, we should welcome the
rule-skeptic, as long as he does not forget that it is at the fringe that he is
welcome; and does not blind us to the fact that what makes possible these
striking developments by courts of the most fundamental rules is, in the great
measure, the prestige gathered by courts from their unquestionably rulegoverned operations over the vast, central areas of the law.
HART, supra note 33, at 154.
220. ROGERS, supra note 12.
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integrity at the core of trademark philosophy. Trademark law has not
only survived but has also flourished because of its simple elegance. The
doctrine must be returned to this simplicity to ensure that businesses are,
in fact, games played fairly among gentlemen.

